Coldest Winter
Beneath the headline surface, the situation looks dire for Ukraine.
Most of the stories about Ukraine have been positive lately, but if you dig a bit deeper than the headlines of successful strikes on oil refineries and speculation about whether Crimea can be cut off from the Russian mainland, you find some worrying news. Modest battlefield successes and attacks on refineries may turn out to be more style than substance, especially given how Russia has been able to destroy less flashy but more important Ukrainian infrastructure.
First and foremost is the continued churn at the top level of politics. Ministers come and go quickly, and rumours of corruption swirl. Recently, Mykhailo Fedorov was ousted as defence minister despite having only been in the post for about half a year. The reason is ostensibly that he had trouble communicating with the armed forces, but there are also rumours that his modernising ways created problems for oligarchs and powerbrokers who corruptly profited through the old military contract system. Colour me sceptical – you’d be hard pressed to come up with a more glorious reason for being fired. Still, president Zelensky does have some issues with keeping top staff from being implicated in corruption scandals, an especially annoying problem given anti-corruption protests erupted last year, and that any attempt to join the EU hinges on getting corruption under control.
The more worrying development is how successful the Russian bombing campaign targeting Ukrainian infrastructure has been. France24 reports Zelensky stating that “virtually none” (“quasiment aucune”) of the country’s central heating plants function. There is time to repair until the winter, but the efficiency gains of centralised heating infrastructure are not outweighed by the vulnerability to attack that centralisation brings. The coming winter will likely be the toughest yet for Ukrainians, especially given the increase in energy prices brought on by the closure of the strait of Hormuz.
Another side effect of the war in Iran is the reported US shortage of interceptor missiles. CNN reports that some 80% of its stock of interceptors, as well as almost all long rage surface-to-air missiles. The US no longer has missiles to spare for Ukraine, even if it were to regain the interest in helping Kyiv. This means that the Russian air campaign is likely to increase in effectiveness just as the situation is at its worst for Ukraine. Ukraine has successfully developed counter-drone technology, but stopping a Geran is a different ball game to stopping a Kinzhal.
I feel increasingly worried that the analogy I made in a February post, that losing a war of attrition is a lot like going bankrupt – you do it slowly at first, then all at once – is quite apt. Of course, it is not over until it is over, but things are not looking good, and this winter could prove to be the time when brutal logic of attrition warfare finally swings the war decisively in Russia’s favour.
If you liked this post you can read a previous post about what I call 'market epistemology' here or the rest of my writings here. I also have a section for longer reads I call essays here, I particularly recommend my series called The Bird & The Technoking exploring Elon Musk's takeover of Twitter, and its political and cultural implications. It'd mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
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Cover photo by Meriç Tuna from Pexels, edited by Karl Johansson
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