The Game Theory of NATO

The game theory of NATO doesn't make sense.

With Russian drones entering Polish airspace recently I have seen plenty of talk about how NATO needs to respond forcefully. The fact that newspaper columnists have the time to urge their government to respond is a clear sign that there has not been nor will there be a forceful response. Leaving aside whether or not a forceful response is truly needed, I want to dive into the game theory dynamics of NATO which I argue make it impossible for it to forcefully respond to provocations.

The classic example of game theory in international relations is the prisoner’s dilemma, a deceptively simple game about two captured criminals who are interrogated separately by the police. The idea is that both criminals can choose to be quiet or to tell on their partner where they will both be best off if neither of them tell on the other, but where they would be better off telling on their partner if they think the partner may talk. Essentially, it’s a game which explores why two parties may not cooperate if they cannot be completely sure of another’s intentions – despite the fact that it is in both parties’ interest to cooperate.

The relevance to international relations is fairly obvious. Should NATO members forcefully respond to the Russian provocation? Well, if everyone does it it would benefit everyone. However, if some members do and some don’t it would make those who do respond forcefully exposed to potential Russian escalation. In short, there is an ideal outcome which the parties could easily get to if they all cooperate but there are also incentives not to cooperate for individual countries.

The classic way of explaining the prisoners’ dilemma is to use a two by two grid where one details the actions and consequences for both prisoner one and prisoner two, but the game can be expanded to more than two prisoners. What if, for example, there were 32 prisoners? Well, then the possibilities are not limited to the four potential outcomes of the original prisoners’ dilemma but exponentially and by orders of magnitude more outcomes. 32² outcomes to be precise, or in plain English one thousand twenty four potential outcomes. The maths speak for themselves.

Getting all NATO members to sign on to a forceful response is an effort in herding cats, which will almost certainly result in one or more member states shirking their responsibility to the alliance. Obviously, real life is more complicated than the prisoners’ dilemma which does not need to take in additional factors like the relative power between actors, geography, domestic politics etc. but that only adds to my point. A forceful response is not likely, and never will be unless the alliance radically reshapes and reorients itself for the 21^st century.

If you liked this post you can read a previous post about my frustrations with technology here or the rest of my writings here. I also have a section for longer reads I call essays here, I particularly recommend my essay on Silicon Valley and AI called 'No Acoustic Guitars in Silicon Valley'. It'd mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!

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I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.

Written by Karl Johansson

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Cover photo by lil artsy from Pexels, edited by Karl Johansson